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Food policy and poverty in Indonesia: a general
equilibrium analysis∗
Peter Warr†
Rice is Indonesia’s staple food and accounts for large shares of both consumers’ budgets
and total employment. Until recently, Indonesia was the world’s largest importer, but
rice import policy is now highly protectionist. Since early 2004, rice imports have been
ofﬁcially banned. Advocates of this policy say it reduces poverty by assisting poor
farmers.Opponentssayitincreasespoverty,stressingnegativeeffectsonpoorconsumers.
This paper uses a general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy to analyse the
effects of a ban on rice imports. The analysis recognises 1000 individual households,
includingallmajorsocioeconomiccategories,disaggregatedbyexpendituresperperson.
Ittakesaccountofeffectsoneachhousehold’srealexpenditureanditsincome,operating
through wages and returns to land and capital. The results indicate that the rice import
ban raises the domestic price of rice relative to the import price by an amount equivalent
to a 125percent tariff, six times the pre-2004 tariff. Poverty incidence rises by a little
under 1percent of the population and increases in both rural and urban areas. Among
farmers, only the richest gain. These results are qualitatively robust to variations in key
parametric assumptions.
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1. Introduction: Indonesia’s rice import policy
In staple food importing countries, policies affecting the quantities and prices of those
imports are always politically sensitive. This is especially true of developing countries,
where staple foods normally account for large shares of both consumers’ budgets
and total employment. In Indonesia the staple food, rice, represents 7.2percent of
average consumer expenditure.1 Its production employs 7.1percent of the total work
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1 This expenditure share is based on Indonesia’s national accounts. The average expenditure
share calculated from the national income and expenditure survey (Susenas) is considerably























































































































Figure1 Real price of rice, Indonesia, 1969–2003.
Note: Units are Rp. per kg., 1996 prices. Source: Bulog (rice prices) and Central Bureau of
Statistics, Jakarta (CPI).
force at the farm level alone. These points apply with particular force for the lowest
income groups, for whom both the average share of rice in total consumption and the
dependence on rice production as a source of employment far exceed the average for
the whole population. For example, for that part of the workforce with only primary
school education or less, the production of paddy (rice produced at the farm level)
accounts for 18percent of total employment.
Indonesia is a net importer of rice, although the magnitude of its imports varies
depending on domestic production, international prices, the size of Indonesia’s stocks
and the government’s rice import policy. Over the 4years following the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis of 1997–1998 (1998–2001, inclusive) Indonesia’s rice imports were 9.1percent
of its total consumption of rice and 18percent of the world’s total imports, making
Indonesia the world’s largest importer. Thailand was the largest exporter, followed by
Vietnam and the USA.
Before the ﬁnancial crisis Indonesia’s rice imports were monopolised by a public
food marketing agency, Bulog. Figure1 shows that the real price of rice in Indone-
sia was relatively stable from 1969 to 1996, except during the 1973 commodity price
boom. The real price surged temporarily during the exchange rate volatility and in-
ﬂation of 1997–1998, but its post-crisis level was above its level over the previous
three decades, even though international rice prices have declined relative to other
higher than this, but the difference arises not from a difference in estimated expenditure on rice
(thenumerator),butadifferenceintotal expenditures(thedenominator).ItappearsthatSusenas
understates expenditures on non-food items, leading to the impression that rice expenditures are
proportionately more important than they are.



































































































































Figure2 World price and domestic price of rice, Indonesia, 1985–2004.
Note:‘Worldprice’meansc.i.f.importpriceofmilledricein$USconvertedtoRupiahincurrent
prices using market exchange rate. ‘Domestic price’ means market price in Jakarta of milled rice
in Rupiah, current prices. Source: Bulog (rice prices) and Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta
(exchange rates).
traded commodities. From this and from Figure2, it is apparent that until the 1997–
1998 crisis the effects of Bulog’s market interventions were to stabilise rice prices
relative to international prices at a level not signiﬁcantly different from the trend
level of world prices (Timmer 1996, 2005). With the exchange rate volatility of the
crisis period, local currency prices of imported rice surged. Despite this, Indonesian
domestic prices remained below exchange rate adjusted world prices for a brief pe-
riod, but from circa 2000 onwards they stabilised at levels 30–35percent above import
prices.
The large difference between the domestic and import price arose from changes in
riceimportpolicythatfollowedthe1997–1998crisis.Bulog’smonopolyonriceimports
was abolished in 1998, but this agency still accounted for approximately 75percent
of total imports. From 2000 onwards, private imports were subject to a speciﬁc tariff
(ratherthananadvaloremtariff)ofRp.430perkg.Thiswasequivalentto21.4percent
of the average import price (c.i.f.) from January 2000 to December 2003 (Rp.2007 per
kg). The average domestic price over the same interval (Rp.2643) exceeded the c.i.f.
import price by 31.7percent. In addition, private sector rice imports were subject to
‘red lane’ customs treatment, meaning stricter standards of customs inspection than
other food items, and were also subject to special import licensing requirements. The
tariff plus these non-tariff barriers account for the increased difference between the
domestic price and the landed price of imported rice.
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In2003,theMinistryofAgricultureproposedanincreaseinthetariffof75percent–
from Rp.430 to 750 per kg – raising the ad valorem equivalent tariff from 21percent to
approximately 37percent. The tariff increase was opposed by the Ministry of Finance,
which has ultimate responsibility for all taxes, but not for non-tax instruments like
an import ban, which in the case of rice is under the joint authority of the Ministry
of Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture. In early 2004, a ban on rice imports was
introduced. The ban was said to be ‘seasonal’, but more than a year later it remained
in place and the word ’seasonal’ had been dropped. Nevertheless, special exemptions
and a certain amount of smuggling apparently still permitted some imports of rice to
enter Indonesia.
Atruly‘seasonal’;ban–oneimplementedonlyduringspeciﬁc,pre-announcedtimes
of the year – would have little effect. Anticipating the ban, importers would stockpile
imports during periods when the ban was not in place, hoping to beneﬁt from higher
pricesduringthebanseason.Holdingtheinternationalpriceconstant,theeffectwould
merelybetoforceimportersorotherstoincurmorestoragecoststhanwouldotherwise
be optimal. Because of these costs, there would be a small price increase during the
period of the ban, compared with the price that would otherwise obtain, but otherwise
no effect.To beeffective,a ban must be permanent,or at least unanticipated.However,
a seasonal ban is capable of insulating the domestic price from temporary ﬂuctuations
in the international price which might occur during the period of the ban and which
would otherwise be transmitted to the domestic price.
The following section summarises the debate over rice protection in Indonesia. The
next section brieﬂy describes the Wayang general equilibrium model of the Indone-
sian economy, which is then applied to the analysis of the distributional effects of a
restriction of rice imports, focusing on its effects on poverty incidence. The analysis
uses considerable sensitivity analysis around the assumed values of key parameters.
The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. The debate over rice protection
2.1 The argument for protection
Arguments supporting restrictions and/or tariffs on rice imports have come in part
from Bulog and the Ministry of Agriculture. First, it has been said that without protec-
tion Indonesia’s rice sector cannot achieve the goal of rice self-sufﬁciency – a strongly
held objective of many of Indonesia’s political leaders (World Trade Organization
2003) despite its lack of any sound economic foundation.
Second, protection has been said to be necessary because world rice prices are ‘dis-
torted’ by export subsidies in major exporting countries. This argument is seemingly
no stronger than the ﬁrst (Erwidodo and Ratnawati 2004). If rice import prices were
to be permanently depressed by exporter policies which amount to ‘dumping’, then
no matter how ‘distortionary’ these policies may be from a global perspective, In-
donesia’s most rational policy would be to adjust to this feature of its international
environment and reallocate resources accordingly, rather than to protect its domestic
economy from the cheaper imports which the exporting countries now (so kindly)
provide.
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Third, protection has been said to be desirable because it has favourable income
distributional effects. Compared with free trade, protection would supposedly reduce
poverty because by raising the domestic price of rice it increases the incomes of poor
farmers.
2.2 The argument against protection
Critics of protection for the rice industry have questioned the third of these arguments
in particular. The distributional case for protection is at most a second-best argument.
It assumes that ﬁrst-best instruments like the social safety nets that were established in
the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis are unavailable for redistributing incomes
to poor farmers and/or other poor groups. However, the critics of protection have
denied that protection of the rice industry really does beneﬁt the poor, claiming that
an increase in the domestic price will actually increase poverty incidence. The analysis
advanced most frequently distinguishes net producers and net consumers of rice. It
says that protection beneﬁts the former at the expense of the latter.
The ‘net producers’ are sellers of rice, meaning farmers owning rice-producing land
and renters of this land. The ‘net consumers’ are rural landless labourers, producers
of agricultural commodities other than rice and virtually all urban residents, except
for absentee owners of rice-producing land. This group also includes many farmers
who produce some rice but who purchase additional rice with the proceeds from other
sales. It is pointed out that there are more poor people among the net consumers than
the net producers.
Based on these and similar arguments, several studies have claimed that by aban-
doning protection of the rice industry, Indonesia could achieve very large reductions
in poverty. Examples include a quantitative study by Ikhsan (2002), which focuses on
the way price increases affect consumers, and the various Working Papers and Policy
Briefs produced by the Indonesian Food Policy Program sponsored by United States
Agency for International Development (USAID).2
Onedifﬁcultywiththeargumentthatprotectionofthericeindustryworsensincome
distribution is that most, but not all, of the analyses concerned focus on counting the
numbers of poor people in each group. This approach disregards the potentially larger
magnitude of the beneﬁt received by each net producer from a price increase than the
loss incurred by each net consumer. But this point is not necessarily decisive and there
is a potentially more serious defect in the anti-protection argument.
The net producer/net consumer framework is partial equilibrium in character. The
net producers are all supposed to gain from a price rise, while the net consumers all
lose. The supposed beneﬁciaries – net producers – include only owners and renters of
rice land. It is implicitly assumed that a price increase would affect net consumers of
rice only through the consumer prices they face, and not through their incomes. For
example, landless labourers employed in the rice sector, which includes vast numbers
of poor people, are counted among the net consumers of rice – the supposed losers
fromprotection–becausetheyderivetheirincomesfromthesaleoftheirlabour,rather
than the sale of rice.
2 These reports are available at www.macrofoodpolicy.com.
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But suppose that rice producers respond to the increase in prices with an increase
in rice output. Expansion of rice production would, in itself, increase the demand for
unskilled labour. This would in turn be reﬂected in some combination of increased
employment of otherwise unemployed unskilled workers and an increase in their real




the argument that has been advanced against protection of Indonesia’s rice industry
ignores any such effects.
2.3 Supply response of domestic rice producers
It seems likely that long-run supply response in the Indonesian rice industry would be
inelastic, but would it be zero? The nature of crop production is that supply response
typically occurs only with some delay – say, 6months to 2years. So long as it remains
in place, protection increases the domestic price permanently. The implicit assumption
of zero supply response, implying zero income effect for ‘net consumers’, may be
appropriate for the very short run – say, periods of less than 1year – but possibly not
for longer periods.
Several empirical studies have looked at the issue of supply response in the In-
donesian context. A 1975 study by Mubyarto on the elasticity of rice planting area
with respect to price, cited by Irawan (1997), estimated the long-run elasticity to
be very low, at 0.03. Irawan (2002) cites two subsequent studies of the elasticity of
planting area with respect to price. These were: a 1988 study by Tabor which es-
timated that in Java this elasticity was 0.22 in wet-land rice production and 0.45
in dry-land production; and a 1996 study by Hutauruk which estimated the same
elasticity on Java to be 0.04 and off Java to be 0.78. Because the overall elasticity
of supply includes the response of yield to price as well as the response of planted
area, the implied output supply elasticities with respect to price will exceed these
estimates.
Irawan (2002) estimates short- and long-term price elasticities of output supply
for several regions and for both wet- and dry-land rice production. The short-
term estimates for wet-land rice were: Java 0.11, Sumatra 0.12, Sulawesi 0.45 and
Kalimantan 0.02. The long-run estimates were: Java 0.13, Sumatra 0.52, Sulawesi 1.25
and Kalimantan 0.21. His estimates for dry-land rice supply response are generally
approximately 50percent larger than the above estimates. For example, the long-run
estimate for dry-land rice supply response for Java is 0.21.
In summary, the available econometric evidence, while thin, supports the view that
in Indonesia the overall elasticity of supply response of rice is low, but not zero. The
estimates are higher in the long run than the short run, higher in dry-land conditions
than wet-land conditions and generally higher off-Java than on-Java. The true value
of the long-run elasticity of rice output with respect to price for Indonesia remains
uncertain. Estimates in the range of 0.2–0.4, but not zero, would be consistent with the
available evidence.
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2.4 The optimal tariff argument
In the case of Indonesia’s rice imports there is a possible further case for protection
which rests on economic efﬁciency alone – the ‘optimal tariff argument’. Strangely,
the current debate on rice protection has ignored this argument, even though its
potential implications are signiﬁcant. Indonesia is a large importer of rice relative
to the world market and seemingly possesses a degree of monopsony power. Higher
imports from Indonesia will induce some increase in the world price. The marginal
cost of Indonesia’s imports therefore exceeds the world price. In these circumstances,
starting from a position of zero protection, it is possible to raise national income
by restricting imports. In a famous contribution, Harry Johnson demonstrated that
if the elasticity of supply of imports to a country is ε, then the rate of tariff which
maximises national income is 1/ε (Corden 1974). The lower the elasticity, the higher
the optimal tariff. For example, if the elasticity of world supply was 5, the optimal
tariff (or tariff-equivalent restriction of imports) would be 20percent.
How important could the optimal tariff argument be in the case of Indonesia’s
rice imports? Econometric estimates of the supply of imported rice to Indonesia have
apparently not been undertaken, but a closely related question has been studied in
depth. This is the elasticity of demand for rice on the world market for the world’s
largest exporter, Thailand. Indonesia’s rice imports come primarily from Thailand, so
the types of rice involved are identical. Suppose ﬁrst that Thailand exported 1 million
tons of additional rice onto the world market. The world price would fall, somewhat.
Now suppose that Indonesia imported 1 million tons less rice from the world market.
Again, the world price would fall, by the same amount.
Studies of the long-run elasticity of demand for Thailand’s rice exports are reviewed
inWarr(2001).Theyhaveproducedestimatesrangingfrom−2.5to−5.Ifthevolumeof
Indonesia’s imports was the same as the volume of Thailand’s exports, the elasticity of
supplyofriceimportstoIndonesiawouldbethesameasthisbutwiththeoppositesign.
Over the 3years (1998–2000), Indonesia’s rice imports were approximately 70percent
ofthelevelofThailand’sriceexports,implyingelasticitiesofsupplyofbetween3.6and
7.2. These elasticities imply optimal tariffs of 28percent and 14percent, respectively.
The central problem with this analysis, however, is that the econometrically based
evidence almost certainly understates the true long-run elasticities of world supply. If
the world price were to rise permanently, say because a major importer like Indonesia
increaseditsimportsrelativetotheleveltheywouldotherwisehavetaken,newsuppliers
would almost certainly enter the world market. But because these suppliers are not
exporters at current world prices, their supply response behaviour is not reﬂected in
available statistical data. This means the above estimates are almost certainly upper
bounds on the values that an optimal tariff could reasonably take. The true value of the
long-run elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia would probably lie between 7
and10.Tariffsintheneighbourhoodof10–14percentwouldthereforeseemthelargest
that could be justiﬁed through the optimal tariff argument, based on maximisation of
national income; but the optimum is presumably not zero.
The optimal tariff argument could never justify a complete ban on imports because
a ban nulliﬁes the terms of trade beneﬁt that is central to the analysis. Furthermore,
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even a partial ban (a binding but not prohibitive quantitative restriction) differs from
a tariff in that it generates rents to the recipients of the import quotas rather than
revenue for the government. In any case, the ‘optimal’ levels of protection discussed
above relate to the maximisation of national income and ignore distributional effects.
Protection also has distributional consequences. The analysis presented in this paper
shows how these effects can be analysed.
3. The Wayang general equilibrium model
An adequate analysis of the distributional effects of a restriction on rice imports must
take account of its effects on households’ expenditures, disaggregated by household
group,butalsoitseffectsontheirincomes.Thisrequirestakingaccountofitseffectson
thelabourmarketaswellasonthereturnstoland.Indoingthis,thericeindustrycould
not be considered in isolation. A change in unskilled wages would affect proﬁtability
in other industries, with effects on outputs, employment and prices in those industries.
These effects would have repercussions on household incomes, which must then be
balanced against the negative effects on consumers of an increase in the consumer
price of rice. However, the consumption of rice could not be considered in isolation
either.Anincreaseinthepriceofricewouldhaveimplicationsforthedemandforother
staple foods, such as those based on corn and wheat ﬂour, another signiﬁcant import.
Finally, import restrictions generate rents to quota holders and these also need to be
considered.
For analysing the distributional effects of trade policy, a general equilibrium treat-
ment is essential. The debate over Indonesia’s rice protection illustrates this point.
The economic issues involved are complex and interrelated. A framework is required
which accounts for these interactions and which is internally consistent, meaning that
it simultaneously satisﬁes all relevant market-clearing conditions and macroeconomic
constraints.Toaddressissuesofpovertyandinequality,suchaframeworkmustalsoin-
clude a disaggregated household sector. Moreover, as the above discussion has shown,
the full effects of rice protection depend on the values of key economic parameters
the true values of which are uncertain. A framework is therefore needed in which the
values of key parameters can be varied to determine the sensitivity of the results to the
assumed values of these parameters.
This study applies the Wayang general equilibrium model of the Indonesian econ-
omy (Warr etal. 1998; Wittwer 1999). Only its essential features are summarised here.
A longer version of the present paper (Warr 2005) describes the model in greater detail
anddiscussesthemodelclosureandresultsmorefully.Previousstudiesusingthemodel
includeWarrandThapa(2002)andFaneandWarr(2003).Wayangbelongstotheclass
of general equilibrium models which are linear in proportional changes, which also
includes the inﬂuential ORANI general equilibrium model of the Australian economy
(Dixon etal. 1982), but the structure is adapted in light of Indonesian conditions. It is
solved using the multi-step procedure described by Codsi etal. (1991). The principal
structural features of the model are summarised in Table1.
The model’s database is derived from the Indonesian Input-Output Table for 2000,
theSocialAccountingMatrix(SAM)for2000,andthe1999Susenashouseholdincome
and expenditure survey, all published by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics.
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Table1 Structure of the Wayang general equilibrium model
Industries Commodities Factors Households
Agricultural sectors: 18 Producer goods: 65 Skilled labour: 1 Rural households, in
7 socioeconomic
categories: 700
Resource sectors: 5 Consumer goods: 20 Unskilled labour: 1













Source: For further detail on Wayang model structure, see Warr (2005).
Table2 compares the cost structure of the paddy industry (farm-level production of
rice) with other agricultural industries and with the non-agricultural sectors. Contrary
to what might be supposed, the paddy industry is not particularly intensive in its use of
unskilled labour, which accounts for only 4.3percent of total costs and 5.25percent
of total variable costs, both well below other agricultural industries and the rest of the
economy, on average. This point will be important for later discussion.
The model contains 10 major household categories – seven rural and three
urban – as identiﬁed in the Indonesian SAM. They are summarised in Table3. The
sources of income of each of these household types depend on their ownership of
factors of production, as summarised in Table4. The SAM is based primarily on
the household income and expenditure survey called Susenas. Drawing on the 1999
Susenas data, each of the 10 household categories is subdivided into a further 100
subcategories each of the same population size, arranged by real consumption ex-
penditures per capita, giving a total of 1000 subcategories. The consumer demand
Table2 Cost shares of major factors of production: paddy and other industries (per cent of
industry’s total costs)
Other Non- All
Cost components Paddy agriculture agriculture industries
Unskilled labour 4.3 9.0 8.7 8.5
Skilled labour 3.1 6.6 9.8 9.3
Mobile agricultural capital 20.6 21.3 – 2.3
Mobile non-agricultural capital – – 20.5 18.2
Land 18.1 20.2 – 2.1
Non-land ﬁxed capital – – 11.7 10.5
Intermediate inputs 53.9 42.9 49.3 49.1
Total 100 100 100 100
Source:DatabaseofWayangmodel,basedonIndonesianInput–OutputTable,2000,andSocialAccounting
Matrix, 2000, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta.
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Table3 Household categories of Wayang model
Socioeconomic
Code Name category Characteristics
R1 Rural 1 Agricultural
employees
Agricultural workers not owning land
R2 Rural 2 Small farmers Agricultural workers owning land <0.5ha
R3 Rural 3 Medium farmers Agricultural workers owning land 0.5–1ha
R4 Rural 4 Large farmers Agricultural workers owning land >1ha
R5 Rural 5 Rural low income Non-agricultural households in rural areas
R6 Rural 6 Rural non-labour Non-labour force and unclassiﬁed households,
rural areas
R7 Rural 7 Rural high income Non-agricultural rural managers, technicians,
professionals, skilled workers
U1 Urban 1 Urban low income Small urban store owners, entrepreneurs, personal
service providers, clerical and manual workers
U2 Urban 2 Urban non-labour Non-labour force and unclassiﬁed households,
urban areas
U3 Urban 3 Urban high income Urban managers, technicians, professionals, large
entrepreneurs and skilled clerical workers
Source: Based on Central Bureau of Statistics, Social Accounting Matrix, 2000, Jakarta. Note: The Wayang
model has 100 subcategories for each of the above 10 household categories, disaggregated according to real
per capita expenditure, making a total of 1000 household subcategories.
equations for the various household types are based on the linear expenditure system.
Within each of the 10 major categories, the 100 subcategories differ according to their
budget shares in consumption.
Table5 summarises the characteristics of the 10 major household categories in so
far as they relate to poverty incidence. Poor people are found in all 10 household
categories, in proportions varying from roughly 40percent (Rural 1) to 5percent
(Urban3).Toillustrate,Figure3showsthecumulativedistributionofrealexpenditures
for the poorest of the 10 household categories, Rural 1. The ofﬁcially calculated level
of poverty incidence for this household is 39.8percent and the poverty line which
Table4 Sources of factor incomes of the household categories (per cent of household income)
Non-
Agricultural agricultural
Skilled Unskilled variable variable Fixed
Land labour labour capital capital capital Total
Rural 1 4.06 1.37 53.62 2.12 9.33 29.50 100
Rural 2 1.58 6.13 26.74 1.38 16.31 47.87 100
Rural 3 9.77 2.71 14.06 4.83 16.05 52.58 100
Rural 4 9.71 3.96 7.76 4.86 17.37 56.33 100
Rural 5 7.55 6.99 43.27 3.57 8.68 29.95 100
Rural 6 2.77 29.18 15.19 1.73 12.74 38.40 100
Rural 7 12.58 20.69 4.47 5.86 12.41 44.00 100
Urban 1 4.13 12.82 24.39 2.35 13.84 42.47 100
Urban 2 3.22 21.97 42.28 1.69 7.42 23.43 100
Urban 3 4.09 23.78 1.33 2.47 16.95 51.38 100
Source: Database of Wayang model, based on Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix and Susenas survey,
1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta.
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Table5 Expenditure and poverty incidence by household group
% of total Mean per capita % of this % of all
population expenditure group in poor people
in this group (Rp./month) poverty in this group
Household group
Rural 1 8.0 3358 39.8 13.9
Rural 2 14.8 3608 34.9 22.4
Rural 3 7.1 7584 32.3 9.9
Rural 4 9.0 6618 27.8 10.9
Rural 5 16.0 3891 23.8 16.5
Rural 6 4.9 12795 28.0 5.9
Rural 7 5.0 16060 10.5 2.3
Urban 1 20.4 4210 15.2 13.4
Urban 2 6.1 17813 11.2 2.9
Urban 3 8.7 14353 5.0 1.9
Indonesia 100 12084 23.1 100
Memo items
Headcount poverty incidence national (%) 23.076
Headcount poverty incidence rural (%) 29.086
Headcount poverty incidence urban (%) 11.980
Gini coefﬁcient national 0.26646
Gini coefﬁcient rural 0.23676
Gini coefﬁcient urban 0.30491
Source: Database of Wayang model, based on Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix and Susenas survey,
1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta.
replicates this level of poverty incidence, using the Susenas data, is shown in the dia-
gram. In the simulations, the real values of these poverty lines are held constant, using
household-speciﬁc consumer price indices, based on household-speciﬁc budget shares.
Povertyincidenceatthe‘rural’,‘urban’and‘total’levelsiscalculatedbyaggregating
poverty incidence at these 10 household category levels, using their respective popula-
tion shares as weights (Table5). This produces an estimate of the base level of poverty
incidence at the national level of 23.1percent. The incidence in rural areas (29.1%) is
two and a half times that in urban areas (12%). Fully 81.8percent of all poor people
reside in rural areas. Inequality is calculated for the rural, urban and total populations
by constructing a Lorenz curve separately for each, as shown in Figure4, and then
using an Excel-based spreadsheet calculation to compute the Gini coefﬁcient for each.
Figure4 conﬁrms that inequality is higher in urban than rural areas.
The advantage of working with a general equilibrium model with a highly disaggre-
gated household sector is that it becomes possible to conduct controlled experiments,
imposing policy-relevant economic shocks one at a time, and then to focus on the




The database of the model was calibrated to reﬂect a 25percent tariff on rice imports.
For analytical convenience it was assumed that there was a quantitative restriction in
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Poverty incidence = 39.815%
PR1
Figure3 The cumulative distribution of real consumption expenditures per capita – Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM) household category Rural 1, 1999.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Susenas 1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta.
place in this base situation but that the restriction was initially non-binding. The shock
then applied to this base solution was a tightening of the quantitative restriction sufﬁ-
cient to reduce the level of imports, relative to this base, by 90percent. The remaining
imports continue to be subject to the 25percent tariff. Imports are not reduced to
zero because, although the restriction is called a ‘ban’, some imports actually persist.
The quota licenses are assumed to be owned by the household group Urban 3. The
quota rent (revenue obtained from this implicit tax) is distributed in full to this house-
hold category, distributed among its 100 centile subcategories in proportion to their
household expenditures per capita.
4.2 The closure
The simulations are conducted with balanced trade (exogenous balance on current
account), ﬁxed real government spending and ﬁxed real investment demand for each
good. The government budget deﬁcit is held ﬁxed in nominal terms. This is achieved
by endogenous across-the-board adjustments to personal income tax rates so as to
restore the base level of the budgetary deﬁcit.
5. Results
The starting point for the results is Simulation A. In this core simulation:
• The assumed elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia is 10.
• Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology is assumed in all industries and
the assumed elasticities of substitution are 0.5 in all industries except paddy (rice
production) where the value is 0.25, chosen to be consistent with the low values
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Total (Gini = 0.266)
Urban (Gini =  0.305)
Figure4 Lorenz curves of the ex ante distribution of real expenditures per capita, rural popu-
lation, urban population and total population, 1999.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Susenas 1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta.
of the elasticities of supply response which have been estimated empirically for the
Indonesian rice sector.
• The Armington elasticity of substitution in rice demand (the elasticity of substitu-
tion in demand between imported and domestically produced rice) is 6, consistent
with the statistical estimates reported in Warr (2006), implying that imported and
domestically produced rice are close substitutes, but not identical.
Each of these parametric assumptions will subsequently be varied, as shown in
Table6. For the time being it is sufﬁcient to focus on Simulation A.
5.1 Effects on the market for imported rice
The effects that the import restriction has on the market for imported rice are sum-
marised in Table6. As the volume of imports contracts, the import price of rice in
foreign currency (c.i.f.) declines somewhat, but not enough to prevent the domestic
price – both the producer price and the consumer price – from increasing. The in-
creaseinthedomesticpricestimulatesriceproductionandreducesconsumption.From
Table6, the import restriction raises the domestic (landed) price of imports massively,
generatingalargequotarent,equivalenttoanincreaseintheinitialtariff,inadvalorem
terms, of 104percent. Clearly, the import ban is a highly protectionist measure.
TheresultsforSimulationAmaybeunderstoodasfollows.Normalisinginitialprices
at 1, the import restriction raises the domestic price from 1 to 1.6074 and lowers the









Table6 Summary of parametric assumptions and simulated effects on the rice market of a 90percent effective rice import ban
Simulation A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
Parametric assumptions
Elasticity of supply of
imported rice to
Indonesia








66666666248 1 0 2 5 1 0 0
Effects on rice market – per cent change unless speciﬁed
Quantity of imports −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90 −90
Import price of rice,
c.i.f. ($US)
−20.41 −59.87 −36.65 −10.79 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41 −20.41
Domestic price of
imports (Rp.)
62.51 62.54 62.52 62.50 65.06 63.56 61.73 61.13 268.36 98.46 47.26 38.81 19.86 10.15
Producer price of
milled rice (Rp.)
7.82 7.84 7.83 7.82 9.86 8.66 7.20 6.72 9.30 8.15 7.67 7.58 7.36 7.24
Producer price of
paddy (Rp.)
9.23 9.25 9.24 9.22 11.75 10.27 8.46 7.87 10.98 9.61 9.05 8.94 8.68 8.54
Production of milled
rice
2.60 2.60 2.60 2.55 2.17 2.42 2.73 2.78 3.06 2.70 2.55 2.52 2.45 2.41
Production of paddy 2.55 2.56 2.55 2.55 2.14 2.38 2.68 2.83 3.01 2.65 2.50 2.48 2.41 2.37
Tariff equivalent of
quota (%)
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import price from 1 to 0.7959. Writing PR for the domestic price of imported rice, the
proportional tariff equivalent of the quota is then given byt,w h e r ePR = P∗
R(1 + t),
and thus t = (PR/P∗
R) − 1, giving t=(1.6074/0.7959)−1=1.0396, or 104percent.




in rice production does not induce an increase in real unskilled wages, but rather a
decline. The reason is that while rice production uses large quantities of unskilled
labour in total, according to our education-based deﬁnition of this category, the paddy
industry is not intensive in its use of unskilled labour, as discussed above in relation to
Table2.Thecostshareofunskilledlabourinthepaddyindustryisonly4.3percent,less
thantheaverageforallindustries(8.5%)andlessthantheaverageforotheragricultural
industries (9%). Unskilled labour cost as a share of all variable factor costs (excluding
land and ﬁxed capital) is similarly below the economy wide average and below the
average for agriculture.
Table7 Simulated macroeconomic effects of a 90percent rice import ban: varying elasticity of
supply of imported rice (per cent change)
Simulation A B C D
Parameter varied: import
supply elasticity
10 2.5 5 20
Overall economy
Gross domestic product Nominal (local
currency)
0.361 0.445 0.437 0.427
Real −0.076 −0.103 −0.084 −0.067
Consumer price index 0.651 0.657 0.654 0.649
Gross domestic product
deﬂator
0.510 0.548 0.521 0.495
Wage (nominal) Skilled 0.115 0.122 0.118 0.112
Unskilled 0.192 0.200 0.195 0.189
Wage (real) Skilled −0.536 −0.535 −0.536 −0.537
Unskilled −0.459 −0.457 −0.458 −0.460
External sector (foreign currency)
Export revenue −0.212 −0.219 −0.214 −0.207
Import bill −0.136 −0.126 −0.133 −0.142
Government budget (local currency)
Revenue (local currency) Total revenue 0.575 0.587 0.580 0.570
Tariff revenue 0.220 0.230 0.224 0.216
Expenditure Nominal (local
currency)
0.485 0.494 0.488 0.480




0.380 0.398 0.388 0.375
Real −0.267 −0.258 −0.264 −0.272
Source: Author’s computations.
C   Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005444 P. Warr
When the paddy industry expands, large quantities of intermediate goods are de-
manded, such as fertiliser, along with mobile agricultural capital, drawn from other
agricultural industries, but small additional numbers of unskilled workers are hired
directly in paddy production. These other agricultural industries are on average more
labour-intensive than paddy. The mobile capital drawn from them lowers the pro-
ductivity of unskilled labour in those industries, reducing their demand for unskilled
labour by an amount which outweighs the increased demand in paddy production.
Overall demand for unskilled labour falls, and unskilled wages decline, in real terms,
rather than rise. This point is important for the simulated effects on poverty.
5.3 Effects on poverty and inequality
The simulated effects on poverty and inequality are summarised in Table8. The results
have the following important features:
1. Overall poverty incidence rises. The changes in real consumption expenditures are
dominatedbyincreasedlivingcosts,resultinginareductionintherealexpenditures
of the poor and an increase in poverty incidence. Poverty incidence increases in all
household categories, in both rural and urban areas, but the increase in urban
areas (approximately 0.3%) is smaller than the rural increase (approximately 1%).
The central reasons are: (i) urban budget shares for rice are in general well below
rural budget shares; and (ii) the real return to unskilled labour declines and urban
households receive, on average, a lower share of total income from this source.
2. Overall inequality (measured by the Gini coefﬁcient) increases very slightly. Inequal-
ity increases in both rural and urban areas, but the magnitudes are trivial. The
increase in rural inequality is a consequence of the increase in the return to land,





to reduce the ‘noise’ caused by ﬂuctuations in the expenditure shares of rice as
expenditures increase within each household category. Each of the 10 curves shows,
for that socioeconomic group, the distribution across the 100 household centile
subcategories (horizontal axis) of the proportional changes in real consumption
expenditures(verticalaxis).Pointsbelowthehorizontalaxiscorrespondtoadecline
in real expenditures (welfare loss) and points above it correspond to an increase
(welfare gain). The ﬁgure thus summarises the distribution of gains and losses from
the import ban, across the entire population.
A key point is that the curves slope up for each household; the proportional change
in real consumption increases with the level of real expenditure. The principal reason
is that the share of rice in total household expenditures declines as the level of total
expenditures increases. Real consumption declines in all households with real expen-
ditures in the neighbourhood of the poverty line, which is why poverty incidence rises
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Table8 Simulated distributional effects of a 90percent rice import ban: varying rice import
supply elasticity (per cent change, except poverty incidence and Gini coefﬁcient)
Simulation A B C D
Parameter varied: import supply elasticity 10 2.5 5 20
Real consumption expenditures, deﬂated by household-speciﬁc CPI (% change)
Rural Rural 1 −0.608 −0.652 −0.607 −0.609
Rural 2 −0.539 −0.593 −0.538 −0.540
Rural 3 −0.906 −0.944 −0.905 −0.907
Rural 4 −0.910 −0.949 −0.909 −0.911
Rural 5 −0.354 −0.418 −0.353 −0.355
Rural 6 −0.666 −0.712 −0.665 −0.667
Rural 7 −0.072 −0.014 0.075 0.071
Urban Urban 1 −0.020 −0.099 −0.019 −0.022
Urban 2 −0.319 −0.389 −0.318 −0.321
Urban 3 0.190 −0.708 0.203 0.168
Poverty Incidence Simulated outcomes
(% population concerned) Ex ante
Rural households Rural 1 39.815 40.475 40.518 40.475 40.477
Rural 2 34.890 35.358 35.396 35.358 35.360
Rural 3 32.294 32.994 33.232 32.994 32.995
Rural 4 27.821 29.733 29.767 29.733 29.734
Rural 5 23.779 25.244 25.306 25.243 25.246
Rural 6 28.009 28.665 28.699 28.665 28.665
Rural 7 10.501 10.573 10.655 10.572 10.575
Urban households Urban 1 15.216 15.684 15.781 15.683 15.687
Urban 2 11.162 11.325 11.342 11.325 11.326
Urban 3 4.998 5.020 5.221 5.018 5.025
Rural population 29.086 30.032 30.103 30.033 30.035
Urban population 11.980 12.284 12.394 12.284 12.288
Total population 23.076 23.795 23.881 23.798 23.800
Gini coefﬁcient of Simulated outcomes
inequality (index) Ex ante
Rural population 0.23676 0.23754 0.23752 0.23754 0.23754
Urban population 0.30491 0.30581 0.30572 0.30581 0.30580
Total population 0.26646 0.26737 0.26726 0.26737 0.26737
Source: Author’s computations. CPI, consumer price index.
within each household category. However, households with high real expenditures in
categories Rural 7 and Urban 1 gain from the import quota. The principle reasons
for this result are that, compared with other households, these richer households: (i)
have smaller shares of rice in their total expenditures; and (ii) are less reliant on wages
as a source of income. They are thus less affected than others by the increase in the
consumer price of rice and the decline in real wages.
To illustrate, consider the household category Rural 4. In Figure5, the expenditure
centile subcategory corresponding to the poverty line is indicated by the point marked
PR4. This point lies well below the horizontal axis, meaning that real expenditure
for this subcategory falls. Real expenditure for all other poor households within the
category Rural 4 (expenditure centiles below PR4) also declines. All poor households
in this socioeconomic category lose. Poverty incidence must be rising within the Rural
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Figure5 Simulation A: changes in real consumption by household category.
Source: Author’s calculations.
4 category. But this statement applies to every one of the 10 household categories.
Poverty incidence must be rising within each of them, as Table8 conﬁrms.
Figure6 illustrates the way that the change in poverty incidence is calculated. The
ﬁgure focuses on household Rural 4 and magniﬁes the section of the cumulative dis-
tribution of real expenditures for that household category that is close to the poverty
line. The lower line (solid line) shows the ex ante distribution for household Rural 4
and the upper line (dashed line) shows the ex post distribution following Simulation A.
Under the assumptions of Simulation A, as a result of the quota restriction, estimated
poverty incidence within this household increases from 27.8 to 29.7percent.
6. Effects of varying key parameters
To what extent do the results summarised above depend on the values of key pa-
rameters assumed in Simulation A? This question arises because the above discussion
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4, before and after Simulation A.
Note: The bottom line (solid) corresponds to the ex ante distribution (poverty incidence =
27.821) and the top line (dashed) corresponds to the ex post distribution resulting from Simula-
tion A (poverty incidence = 29.733). Source: Author’s calculations.
indicates that there is uncertainty about the true values of several parameters which
seemparticularlyrelevant.Weshallvary,inturn,theelasticityofsupplyofriceimports
to Indonesia, the elasticity of supply response of paddy with respect to its price, and
the Armington elasticity of substitution in demand between domestically produced
and imported rice.
6.1 The elasticity of supply of rice imports
Simulation A assumes that imports of rice are available to Indonesia with an elasticity
of supply of 10. Values of 2.5, 5 and 20 are also considered, in Simulations B, C and
D, respectively, and the simulated implications are summarised in detail in Tables6–8.
The implications for poverty incidence at the national, rural and urban levels are sum-
marised graphically in Figure7. Poverty increases in every case, including both rural
and urban poverty incidence. It is argued above that values of this parameter below
approximately 5 are implausible, but even in such cases poverty incidence increases.
Lower values of the supply elasticity of rice imports to Indonesia imply larger
terms-of-trade beneﬁts for a given level of import restriction, but these terms-of-
trade effects are insufﬁcient to prevent increased poverty incidence. The reason is
that when the elasticity of world supply is low, very large increases in the domestic
price of imported rice are required to achieve the 90percent reduction in the quantity
of imports. Although the import price is forced down by the reduced quantity of
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6.2 The price elasticity of supply response for paddy
It can be shown that the partial equilibrium elasticity of supply response with respect
to the price of output is related to the parameters of the model by the equation
ES = σSV/(SFHP), where ES is the familiar partial equilibrium elasticity of supply
response, σ is the elasticity of substitution between factors of production in the CES
production function for paddy, SV and SF are the shares of variable and ﬁxed factors,
respectively in primary factor cost in paddy production (the variable factors are labour
and mobile capital; the ﬁxed factors are land and ﬁxed capital), and HP is the share of
primary factors (labour, capital and land) in total costs in paddy production (the share
of all inputs except intermediate, material inputs).
Higher values of σ imply greater supply response. The parametric assumptions un-
derlyingSimulationAimplyanelasticityofsupplyresponseof0.31,roughlyconsistent
with the empirically estimated values of this response parameter, as reviewed above.
It is possible to vary this implied elasticity by varying the assumed elasticity of sub-
stitution. Simulations E, F, G and H do this. The assumed elasticities of substitution
of 0.15, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.35 imply elasticities of supply response of 0.186, 0.248, 0.372
and 0.434, respectively. This would seem to cover the full range of plausible values of
this parameter, given the available empirical evidence. The results are summarised in
Figure8.
Theelasticityofsubstitutioninpaddyproductionhasnobearingontheexpenditure-
side effects that are the dominant source of the increased poverty, but it does affect
changes in incomes. The larger this elasticity of substitution, the greater the supply
response and the smaller is the reduction in the real wages of unskilled labour, and
hence the smaller the increase in poverty incidence. Nevertheless, this effect is in every
case too small to reverse the sign of the change in poverty incidence. Poverty incidence
increases throughout the range.
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Figure8 Simulated changes in poverty incidence: varying elasticity of substitution in rice pro-
duction.
Source: Author’s calculations.
6.3 The Armington elasticity of substitution in rice demand
HighervaluesoftheArmingtonelasticityofsubstitutionindemandbetweenimported
and domestically produced rice imply closer substitution between these two forms of
rice. When this parameter is increased, the simulated increase in poverty incidence
declines, but it does not change in sign. These results are summarised in Figure9.
Increasing the Armington elasticity does not imply larger increases in the price of
domestically produced rice, for a given level of quota restriction, as it would with a
Sim N Sim M
Sim I
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Figure9 Simulated changes in poverty incidence: varying Armington elasticity of substitution
in rice demand.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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ﬁxed ad valorem tariff, but rather smaller increases in the landed price of imported
rice. This feature of the results is shown clearly by Table6 (see the columns for Sim-
ulations I–N). Imports are a small share of domestic consumption. Greater substi-
tutability between imports and domestic rice reduces the rents obtainable from the
quota on imported rice. The increase in the consumer price of rice, including both
imported and domestically produced rice, actually declines as the Armington elas-
ticity is increased and the estimated increase in poverty incidence is correspondingly
smaller.
7. Conclusions
Before the 1997–1998 economic crisis, Indonesia was the world’s largest importer of
rice.Followingthecrisis,themovementtowardsamoredemocraticformofgovernment
in Indonesia has so far coincided with a more protectionist policy towards the rice
industry. After a brief period of free imports there was ﬁrst a tariff, at a rate equivalent
to approximately 21percent of the import price. Then, from early 2004 onwards, rice
imports have been ofﬁcially banned, although some imports do continue to enter. It
has been claimed, in support of the ban, that it reduces poverty by assisting poor
farmers. This paper presents a full general-equilibrium analysis of these issues within
a framework that includes all major socioeconomic groups within Indonesia. The
analysis disaggregates households in considerable detail and also varies the assumed
values of key parameters across the seemingly plausible range.
The results indicate that a 90percent effective ban on rice imports increases rice
prices by 125percent, six times the amount of the pre-2004 tariff. Poverty incidence in
Indonesia rises by a little under 1percent of the population – approximately 2 million
people. Under all parametric variations considered, poverty incidence is increased by
the ban. The increase in poverty occurs among all major socioeconomic groups, rural
and urban – including poor farmers, the supposed beneﬁciaries. Only the non-poor
beneﬁt – the richest rural residents, who may be land owners but who tend not to be
farmers, and some better-off urban consumers. These results are presumably relevant
for the political economy underlying rice protection in Indonesia. The message of this
paper is that it is not possible to justify the rice import ban by claiming that it reduces
poverty.
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